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Synthesis
Understanding process, power, and meaning in adaptive governance: a
critical institutional reading
Frances Cleaver 1 and Luke Whaley 1
ABSTRACT. Adaptive governance continues to attract considerable interest in academic and policy circles. This is with good reason,
given its increasing relevance in a globalized and changing world. At the same time, adaptive governance is the subject of a growing
body of critical literature concerned with the ways in which it theorizes the social world. In this paper, we respond to these critiques,
which we see as broadly concerning the process, power, and meaning dimensions of environmental and natural resource governance.
We argue that adaptive governance theory would benefit from engaging constructively with critical institutionalism, a school of thought
that, like adaptive governance, has one foot in commons scholarship. Critical institutionalism conceives of institutional change as a
process of bricolage, where those involved piece together new arrangements from the resources to hand. This approach highlights the
interplay of structure and agency, and illuminates how new governance arrangements form and come to be seen as natural in dynamic
relation to the wider social and cultural landscape. We consider how these arrangements tend to reflect dominant power relations,
whilst the plural nature of social life also provides scope for adaptation and transformative change.
Key Words: culture; institutions; institutional bricolage; politics; resilience; social justice
INTRODUCTION
One way of interpreting the evolution of commons scholarship
since the 1990s is to claim that it has bifurcated along two distinct
paths. The first of these paths saw commons scholarship
increasingly move from a concern with community-level
governance of common pool resources to focus on power-sharing
arrangements between communities and governments. Over time
this comanagement approach merged with the field of adaptive
management, giving rise to adaptive governance (and its
managerial counterpart, adaptive comanagement; Folke et al.
2005, Armitage et al. 2009). The second of these paths saw
commons scholarship encounter research drawing from more
critical social science traditions, including those working in the
fields of anthropology, sociology, and development studies.
Although this is a rather loosely constituted group, in the last five
years Cleaver and others (Cleaver 2012, Hall et al. 2014, Cleaver
and de Koning 2015, Whaley 2018) have attempted to articulate
places of commonality and overlap among the various positions.
In so doing, this second branch has come to be termed critical
institutionalism, and can be considered an attempt to critique and
steer mainstream commons scholarship in a new direction.  
Adaptive governance has gained considerable purchase in both
academic and policy worlds (Stockholm Resilience Centre 2012).
However, there is a growing recognition of the potential for
generating “thicker,” contextualized, and power sensitive
understandings of how adaptive governance works in practice.
This recognition comes both from within the adaptive governance
literature (Vink et al. 2013, Chaffin et al. 2014, Karpouzoglou et
al. 2016) and from aligned literature encompassing different
disciplinary perspectives on environmental governance (Jones
and Sok 2015, Van Hecken et al. 2015, Vatn 2015, Frick-
Trzebitzky 2017, Wilson 2018). More broadly, there have been
several contributions that deal with the relationship between
resilience thinking and social theory (Adger 2000, Cote and
Nightingale 2012, Brown 2014).  
We build upon these various critiques by arguing for the value of
viewing adaptive governance theory through the lens of critical
institutionalism. Although the aforementioned critiques are clear
on the need for more socially informed understandings of
adaptive governance, very few offer meaningful ways of
accomplishing this. We propose that critical institutionalism
offers one valuable way of framing and analyzing the emergence
and evolution of adaptive governance systems by employing
social theoretical insights that are compatible with a concern for
complexity, uncertainty, and change. In particular, we suggest that
critical institutionalism offers the conceptual toolkit for
illuminating process (how particular governance arrangements
emerge and are enacted); power (how they are shaped to benefit
some and not others); and meaning (how they become invested
with meaning and so gain legitimacy and endurance). It is not
our intention to provide a comprehensive comparison of adaptive
governance and critical institutional thinking, but rather to focus
on what critical institutionalism can offer adaptive governance
with respect to these three dimensions of environmental
governance.
METHODOLOGY
To develop the arguments and analysis below, we undertook a
literature review that followed two broad stages. In the first stage,
we developed an understanding of the history and characteristic
features of adaptive governance and critical institutionalism from
key review articles pertaining to the emergence, definition, and
application of these schools of thought. We further employed
snowball sampling of citations within the review articles. These
review articles included for adaptive governance Folke et al.
(2005), Armitage et al. (2009), Chaffin et al. (2014), and
Karpouzoglou et al. (2016). For critical institutionalism they
included Hall et al. (2014) and Cleaver and de Koning (2015).  
The second stage was concerned more specifically with the ways
in which process, power, and meaning are dealt with by the two
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Fig. 1. The evolution of adaptive governance and critical institutionalism.
schools of thought. Alongside the insights gained from the Stage
1 review, we employed a combination of Web of Science and
Scopus searches. For adaptive governance, we searched for
“adaptive governance” and process (no. of results for Web of
Science = 212/Scopus = 152), “adaptive governance” and power
(n = 56/44), “adaptive governance” and meaning (n = 40/6), and
“adaptive governance” and knowledge (n = 149/98). For critical
institutionalism we searched for “critical institution*” and
process (n = 17/39), “critical institution*” and power (n = 20/19),
“critical institution*” and meaning (n = 7/5), and “critical
institution*” and knowledge (n = 10/25). We included the term
“knowledge” in the search because of its relatedness to
“meaning.” Within these articles we then performed word
searches for “process,” “power,” “meaning,” and “knowledge” to
explore they ways in which they are conceptualized and
employed.  
In choosing the two illustrative case studies presented below we
aimed to consider heterogeneous examples in order to capture
issues emerging in different contexts and at various stages of
development of adaptive governance arrangements. We also
sought to include cases from so-called First World and a Third
World country contexts in order to broaden the potential for
capturing potentially interesting differences in the effects of
socioeconomic status, power relations, the relevance of formal
and informal institutions, and climatic and environmental
conditions. Therefore, the Coastal Ring case from Sweden was
chosen for the First World context where there is strong formal
government capacity and adaptive governance emerges through
self-organized initiatives from communities. Here the
management of natural resources is mainly for tourism and
amenity purposes. The SWAUM case from Tanzania was chosen
for the Third World location where there is a weaker formal
government context. Here there has been explicit facilitation of
an adaptive governance approach through social learning
initiated by an NGO, where the management of natural resources
is largely for production. Both case studies have been drawn from
secondary literature and we have verified our framing and
interpretation of each case with the original author (in the case
of the Coastal Ring example) and the prime adviser/facilitator
(in the case of the SWAUM example).
TWO EVOLVING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
The introduction highlighted that both adaptive governance and
critical institutionalism have one foot in commons scholarship.
We review in more detail the evolution of both schools of thought,
paying attention to the disciplinary influences that underpin them
and that have provided them with their own distinctive framing,
arguments, and insights (Fig. 1). By way of schematic
comparison, we think of adaptive governance as a complex
adaptive systems approach (Levin 1999, Schultz et al. 2015) in
contrast to critical institutionalism, which we instead label a
complex embedded systems approach (Peters 1987, Cleaver 2012).
The discussion highlights what we consider as key weaknesses of
adaptive governance and the potential for critical institutionalism
to address these by focusing on questions of process, power, and
meaning. By charting the evolution of the two schools of thought,
we also draw attention to different stages in their development.
Broadly speaking, these relate to ways in which both adaptive
governance and critical institutionalism have embraced
complexity as well as a tendency at times to promote normative
or prescriptive understandings.
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Adaptive governance: from complexity to recipe ... and back
again?
Evolution of a complex approach
Adaptive governance is a holistic endeavor that focuses on the
management of ecosystems across landscapes and seascapes
(Folke 2006). Underpinning it is a sound logic concerned with
how humans cope with some of the most pressing issues in the
word today. In large part, these relate to various forms of
complexity and uncertainty that have become increasingly
accentuated in recent decades. They include the effects of climate
change, environmental degradation, demographic change, and
population growth, which are all now experienced through the
prism of globalization. Many of the key insights that provide
adaptive governance with its distinctive complexion can be traced
back to developments and arguments in ecology in the 1970s.
From this time onward, Holling and others (Holling 1973, 1978,
Holling and Meffet 1996, Gunderson and Holling 2002) argued
against the forms of technocratic, top-down, and efficiency-
oriented environmental management that came to prominence in
the 20th Century. In particular, they claim that this rigid approach
to management results in pathological outcomes (Holling and
Meffet 1996) and stifles the innovation needed to manage
effectively in an unstable operating environment (Glasbergen
1998, Pahl-Wostl 2006, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007).  
As a remedy, adaptive management was proposed. In contrast to
a command-and-control management style, here the focus is on
learning to live with change and uncertainty through an ongoing,
iterative relationship between management interventions and
environmental change. In particular, environmental management
policies and practices are treated as hypotheses to be tested,
learned from, and adapted in accordance with changing contexts
and outcomes (Holling 1978, Gunderson 1999). Thus, adaptive
management is viewed as a way of increasing system resilience in
the face of dynamism and unpredictability, where much of the
theoretical basis for this approach derives from work on complex
adaptive systems (Levin 1999, Gunderson and Holling 2002). It
is perhaps the need to prioritize resilience and not efficiency that
is most emblematic of this shift in thinking (Folke 2006), and its
corollary in terms of management approach.  
Over time, the concept of adaptive management merged with the
concept of comanagement and with commons scholarship more
generally. This merger resulted in adaptive comanagement, which
combines the learning dimension of adaptive management with
the linkages dimension of comanagement (Olsson et al. 2004a, 
Plummer 2009, Armitage et al. 2009). Adaptive governance is seen
to enable adaptive comanagement. That is, although the two terms
are intimately connected, adaptive governance is understood as
the broader social arrangements operating across multiple scales,
within which adaptive comanagement sits (Folke et al. 2005).  
In keeping with its basis in the new ecology, adaptive governance
is founded upon a number of core principles that include the need
to live with change and uncertainty, to foster adaptive capacity,
to understand human and natural systems as intrinsically
coupled, and to consider resilience as the central desirable
attribute. From this perspective, the focus is on understanding
and facilitating governance arrangements that enhance a broad
range of ecosystem services by coordinating multiple interests
across multiple levels (Olsson et al. 2004b, Brunner et al. 2005,
Folke et al. 2005). The networks of actors that emerge and evolve
as an adaptive governance system develops must capitalize on
windows of opportunity, and are characterized by relations that
promote social learning, power sharing, and flexible institutions
capable of accommodating and responding to change and
uncertainty arising from both environmental and social sources
(Folke et al. 2005, Armitage et al. 2007, Berkes 2007).
Recipes for adaptive governance
The above consideration of adaptive governance suggests it is a
laudable project that has brought together ecology with social
science, embraces complexity, and provides the hope of ecosystem
protection and livelihood sustainability under uncertain and
changing conditions. Yet as research into this area has proceeded,
adaptive governance, and its managerial counterpart, adaptive
comanagement, is at risk of being all-too-easily caricatured. In
the process, the danger is that the characteristics that have come
to be associated with adaptive governance become normative
endpoints in their own right, a sort of “recipe of ingredients.”  
According Chaffin et al. (2014), Dietz and colleagues (2003) were
among the first to propose a generalized list of criteria necessary
for adaptive governance, entailing inclusive dialogue, layered
institutions, and mixed institutional types and designs that
facilitate experimentation, learning, and change. Significantly,
they also proposed a prescriptive list of what adaptive governance
should do (provide information; deal with conflict; induce rule
compliance; provide infrastructure; and be prepared for change).
This has significant appeal to policy makers because it helps to
render complex system dynamics legible. Thus, for example,
Nunan (2016), in a report for professionals in the UK Department
of International Development (DFID), is able to boil down the
features of adaptive governance systems and processes to a six-
point list.[1]  
A first point to note here is that many of the attributes associated
with adaptive governance could describe a generic spectrum of
governance arrangements, some of which are quite different from
those adaptive governance scholars have in mind. This is
especially true in an age of globalization where the likes of cross-
scale interplay, polycentricity, shadow networks, and forms of
trust, learning, and partnership working seem obvious. Although
the picture is more complicated than this, the point is that in the
process of becoming normative, concepts uncouple from what
originally made them meaningful.  
A second point is that the adaptive governance model appears
inherently optimistic about the possibility of developing common
understandings, trust, and collaboration between different
interests and interest groups. Again, this appears to relate to a
normative commitment to concepts that have been distilled and
dislodged from the contextual details of the case studies in which
they originated. It also relates to how the “social” of social-
ecological systems is theorized and understood. In adaptive
governance thinking, there appears to be an implicit assumption
that social systems are largely analogous in their functioning to
ecological ones, with similar processes of adaptation and
adjustment occurring in evolving complex systems (Cote and
Nightingale 2012).
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Back to complexity?
Various commentators argue for the need to pay more attention
to the process, power, and meaning dimensions of adaptive
governance. For Chaffin and colleagues (2014), adaptive
governance interventions cannot proceed on the basis of
normative lists but “should be preceded by an explicit analysis of
relevant power and politics ... that may be precipitating
environmental and social injustices stemming from the
marginalization of minority cultures, religions, worldviews, and
environmental ethics” (Chaffin et al. 2014). In the same vein,
Armitage (2008:7) has argued that the normative principles
derived from the resilience and commons literature would benefit
from “political ecological interpretations [that] help to reveal the
challenge of actualizing these principles and the contextual forces
that make entrenched, top-down management systems resilient
to change.”  
The call for better understandings of power and politics runs
through related literature.[2] For example, Wilson (2018), writing
from a human geography perspective, points to the depoliticized
nature of much resilience research and its lack of recognition of
social contingency, and of the variable capacities of different
actors to shape governance systems. Critiquing the “gospel of
resilience,” Nadasdy (2007) stresses how most management
institutions and practices are embedded in unequal relations of
capitalist production that make any reform of these institutions
unlikely to lead to the equitable treatment of local and indigenous
peoples. The author concludes that “adaptive co-management,
like all environmental management, is an inherently political
undertaking, not simply a technical one” (Nadasdy 2007:223).  
The recognition of these limits raises questions as to how they
can be addressed. Karpouzoglou and colleagues (2016) argue that
insights from other theoretical perspectives can help to illuminate
some of the gray areas of adaptive governance including those of
power and politics, inclusion and equity, and short-term and long-
term change. So for example, they see studies of environmentality
(Boyd et al. 2014) as valuable in illuminating power processes.
Stone-Jovicich (2015) has considered the benefits of probing the
interface between resilience research and three fields of social
science, namely materio-spatial world systems analysis, critical
realist political ecology, and actor-network theory. Moreover,
Cote and Nightingale (2012:475) argue for “critically examining
the role of knowledge at the intersections between social and
environmental dynamics [in order] to address normative
questions and to capture how power and competing value systems
are not external to, but rather integral to the development and
functioning of SES.”  
In literature applying an ecological economics lens to market-
based approaches for securing adaptive environmental
governance, Van Hecken and colleagues (2015) suggest that there
are three challenges to overcome. These are the idea that
institutions can be designed to fit specific human-nature
problems; the oversimplification of culture and social diversity
and the apolitical conceptualization of social capital; and the
overly rational or overly structuralist models of human agency,
collective action, and institutional change. They suggest that there
is a need to expand actor oriented, socially informed, and power
sensitive understandings to generate insights into the way that
“power geographies” underlie institutional logics, and the
complex ways in which particular interventions are experienced.  
Taken together, the above points provide a link to critical
institutional approaches that are well placed to address the issues
highlighted. In particular, the ways in which critical
institutionalism is able to shed theoretical light on the process,
power, and meaning dimensions of adaptive governance would
appear highly relevant. We now turn to characterizing the
evolution of critical institutional approaches, with a focus on
these three themes.
Critical institutionalism: from recipe to complexity ... and back
again?
From “getting institutions right” to complexity
The upsurge of critical institutional literature relating to natural
resource management can be traced back to reactions to the
“institutional turn” in development theory and policy (Portes
2006). In the 1990s and 2000s, economists and political scientists
concurred that “getting institutions right” mattered for
development outcomes and contributed to good governance.[3] 
These dominant mainstream approaches, epitomized by the new
institutional economics and the commons scholarship of Elinor
Ostrom (1990, 2005), adopted a model of institutions as rules of
the game (North 1990) that both enable and constrain human
action and reduce transaction costs. This model was underpinned
by broadly rational choice assumptions about the nature of
individual action. The potential for crafting incentives, rules, and
sanctions to shape human behavior in relation to the environment
became linked to normative good governance principles of
representativeness, participation, transparency, and accountability.
Such ideas became very influential in shaping policy for natural
resource management in the Global South (Saunders 2014).
Often, in practice, the new institutional insights were translated
into prescriptive checklists for institution building and much
effort was expended on establishing Farmers Groups, Forest
Committees, Water User Associations and the like, located in
nested systems of governance.  
A diverse range of critiques questioned the mainstream
institutional views that the critics perceived were based on “thin”
models of institutions (Mehta et al. 1999, Portes 2006).
Originating in quite different academic traditions, all critiques
located governance arrangements more firmly in complex social-
relational systems. From a range of political perspectives came
the critiques of capitalist systems and the attempts to understand
local ecological governance arrangements as located in wider
societal dynamics. Key here was political ecology, an approach
that attempts to locate the ways in which power works in social-
ecological systems by focusing on the relationships between
political, economic, and social factors (Blaikie 2006). Alongside
and sometimes intersecting with this perspective, strands of
thinking developed that emphasized the diversity and
contingency of human made arrangements, the dispersed nature
of power effected through discourses, forms of governmentality,
and the ways that change occurs through negotiation and in
routinized everyday practices (Li 1996, Agrawal 2005).  
From history and anthropology came a raft of cultural critiques
and attempts to reconceptualize institutions and governance
arrangements as embedded in (changing) social relations and
belief  systems, deeply imbued with meaning and symbolism, and
loaded with the significance of the past (Mosse 1997, Johnson
2004, Boelens 2015). Another identifiable (and overlapping)
strand of critique drew from sociological and anthropological
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insights into how institutions work to develop insights into
debates about the balance between social structure and individual
agency (Mehta et al. 2001, Cleaver 2002). “Structure” refers to
resources, social institutions, systems, or forces, generalized at a
societal level, and manifest in recurring patterns of organization
and practices. “Agency” refers to the ways in which individuals
use their capacities or personal powers to act in purposeful and
meaningful ways (King 2005). Here the emphasis is on
understanding governance as effected through plural, hybrid, and
overlapping arrangements in which claims to resources, property,
and authority are constantly being renegotiated (Lund 2006).  
Various attempts have been made to identify commonalities
among these critiques and the academic work they inspired, to
identify the school of thought that we refer to as critical
institutionalism (Cleaver 2012, Hall et al. 2014, Cleaver and de
Koning 2015). For Hall and colleagues (2014) the critiques
coalesce around the argument that we need more socially
informed models of human action, more realistic ideas about
community and the constraints of collective action, and better
understandings of social relations as imbued with power and
meaning.
The “complex-embeddedness” of critical institutionalism
Critical institutionalism endeavors to understand the ways in
which resource governance and service delivery is enacted in
polycentric governance landscapes, characterized by multiple
centres of power and authority. It offers explanations of how
things change in situations of institutional, legal, and policy
plurality to produce uneven outcomes (Hall et al. 2014).
Departing from underlying rational choice assumptions of
commons scholarship, critical institutionalists takes the view that
resource governance systems are socially constructed, whereby
meaning and social reality is historically and geographically
situated and emerges from the interaction between members of a
group or society (Berger and Luckmann 1967). From a critical
institutional perspective, these systems can only be understood
through an examination of the meanings and values that are
attributed to them and the societal/power relations in which they
are embedded.  
This is well illustrated by Marin and Bjorkland’s (2015) study of
reindeer herders in Finnmark, Norway. Here the authors explore
how the idea of the commons and the “tragedy of the commons”
has been created over time by the Norwegian state, along with a
related formal system of management. The reindeer herders
themselves have developed customary local institutions, based on
living and working together, and on different values and premises
emphasizing sharing, cooperation, and flexibility in the use of
grazing lands. These arrangements are patchily aligned with the
broader scale formalized institutions of commons management,
with variable outcomes for the herders and for the environment.
Here the evolution of governance arrangements over time, the
coexistence of multiple institutions at different scales, differences
of understanding and inequalities of power between stakeholders,
all interact to produce a complex governance scenario.  
Core critical institutional principles include the complexity and
“hybridity” (Booth 2012) of institutions entwined in everyday life;
their historical formation and location in the structures of society;
and the dynamic but constrained nature of human agency in
assembling and reshaping institutions. It should be emphasized
that for critical institutionalism the ways in which actors exercise
agency does not infer only deliberative behavior that the
individual can consciously reflect on and justify. In addition to
this “discursive consciousness,” the actions of individuals are
shaped by “practical consciousness” formed in the nonverbal,
tacit knowledge (often contained in routines and habits) that
enables the skilful performance of everyday life without conscious
reflection (Bourdieu 1977). Moreover, as Giddens argues, human
conduct is subject to the unconscious need for ontological security
- for a comfortable state of affairs in which people can go about
their lives in taken for granted ways, in familiar surroundings with
known others (Giddens 1984, Cohen 1988).  
From a critical institutional perspective, the focus is not just on
the public institutions of resource governance and deliberative
decision making but on the dynamic combinations of formal
arrangements, informal practices, and social institutions that
occur in everyday life. Ingram, Ros-Tonen and Dietz (2015)
examine governance arrangements for nontimber forest products
(NTFPs) in Cameroon, exploring the range of forest practices,
customary social arrangements, project-related and market-
based organizations active in managing and monitoring forests.
They characterize the multiple forest uses, and plural governance
arrangements as constituting “a fine mess” but as also providing
the space (in the gaps, overlaps, and gray areas) and institutional
material for the creation of hybrid arrangements that work in a
particular time and place but may do so by excluding particular
forest users.  
Critical institutionalists have a strong interest in how such
institutions come about and are able to explain the dynamic
processes of institutional formation, the variability of outcomes,
and the ways in which power and meaning shape these. Cleaver
(2012) brings anthropological insights into styles of thought and
the working of institutions (Douglas 1986, Levi Strauss 2004)
into engagement with social theory related to the interaction
between individual actions and societal imperatives (Bourdieu
1977, Giddens 1984) to develop the concept of “institutional
bricolage,” defined here:  
The adaptive processes by which people imbue
configurations of rules, traditions, norms, and
relationships with meaning and authority. In so doing
they modify old arrangements and invent new ones but
innovations are always linked authoritatively to
acceptable ways of doing things. These refurbishments
are everyday responses to changing circumstances 
(Cleaver 2012:45). 
Through processes of bricolage, institutional components from
different origins are continuously adapted to perform new
functions. However, institutions can only work and endure (be
resilient) if  they are seen as legitimate and meaningful; that is to
say, if  they socially fit. This fit is effected through calls on
tradition, which may be invented (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983),
and by analogy to accepted ways of doing things and ideas about
proper orders in social, natural, and spiritual worlds (Douglas
1986, Cleaver 2000, Boelens 2015). Authority, in the form of
artefacts, symbols, discourses, and sanctioned power relations are
borrowed from other settings, across time and space, and put to
new uses.  
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Institutional bricolage has been taken up by a range of scholars
working under the broad umbrella of critical institutionalism
(Upton 2009, van Mierlo and Totin 2014, van Oosten et al. 2014,
Verzijl and Dominguez 2015, Warren 2016, Benjaminsen 2017,
Ishihara et al. 2017). We argue that this is at least partly because
of its explanatory power in illuminating how processes, power,
and meaning shape environmental governance arrangements.  
To further illustrate bricolage processes, we turn to Jessica De
Koning’s study of forest governance in Bolivia (2014). She
explores how government attempts from the 1990s to introduce
forest reform included a strengthened regulatory framework for
forest use, increasing community forest management, and a
stronger role for municipalities in forest administration. Because
of a lack of government capacity, NGOs came to take a prominent
role in facilitating the reforms at community level. The reforms
linked forest access to land rights and introduced community
forest plans that could allow a community to obtain logging rights
over 20 years. In the community studied, peasant farmers accessed
the forest for Brazil nut collection as well as for logging. The
imported community forest plan (and an associated forest
association) was adopted for a variety of reasons: because it was
strongly promoted by an NGO, because it appeared to secure
forest-related income streams, and because local people saw it as
a way of establishing land rights to the forest. The forest
management plan and the forest association, promoted as
regularized and institutionalized ways of managing the natural
resource, were also altered by the different stakeholders and
subjected to different logics and meanings. Effectively, the forest
management plan became a substitute for land claims and land
titles. Here we see a plural landscape of actors and institutional
arrangements, different logics that leak across domains, and the
adaptation of introduced arrangements to ensure local fit.  
There are a number of conceptual framings available to critical
institutionalists for understanding how broader power relations
shape institutions and governance, and how power is exercised
visibly and invisibly in public and private social spaces. For
example, Lukes’s (1974) classification directs us to think about
three dimensions of power: the power to publicly influence
decision making, the power to set the agenda (who participates
and what is included or suppressed), and the power to shape or
form people’s interests and wants without them knowing it, often
through wider societal discourses and processes of socialization.
With respect to this third dimension of power, Zwarteveen and
Boelens (2014), discussing water justice, show how discourses
subtly govern the ways in which it is possible to talk about
something, and so make it difficult to think or act differently. This
helps to explain why disadvantaged people do not necessarily see
unequal environmental relations as unfair or unjust (Walker
2014).  
The invisible nature of power is also a feature of governmentality
analyses. This approach applies Foucault’s ideas to people-
environment relations (Agrawal 2005, Li 2007). Governmentality
(or environmentality) refers to the organized and layered practices
through which we are governed and through which, consciously
and unconsciously, we govern ourselves. From a governmentality
perspective, institutions serve as technologies of government,
shaping people’s motivations and behaviors and channelling
relationships. In Agrawal’s (2005) research, village level forest
councils in India worked visibly and invisibly to shape the actions
of forest users, and to channel their participation in decision
making and forest management in particular ways.  
It should be noted that critical institutionalists attribute no
inherent normative value to institutions formed through
bricolage. Features related to institutional resilience may
encompass adaptability, legitimacy, functionality, and endurance
but these are assessed through the outcomes they produce, from
a social justice perspective. Commonly, institutions that endure
across time and space are seen to reproduce and further embed
inequitable relations of access to resources (Johnson 2004, Roth
2009). This poses a challenge to those adopting a critical
institutional lens to plan development interventions; whether to
work with the grain of inequitable power relations and to facilitate
the role of powerful bricoleurs in the interests of effectiveness, or
whether to work against the “elite capture” of institutional
arrangements (Russell and Dobson 2011, Rusca et al. 2015,
Haapala et al. 2016)
Back to “getting institutions right”
Although critical institutionalism offers complex analyses of
institutional formation and functioning, some analysts have
attempted to use the perspective to pragmatically identify
possibilities for transformation in development practices. Here
the plurality and plasticity of institutional dynamics is perceived
to offer multiple entry points for facilitated change (Merrey and
Cook 2012). This focus is echoed in contemporary policy concerns
of the possibilities of “working with the grain” to support local
hybrid institutional arrangements that work (Booth 2012). In a
study of adaptation to urban flooding in Accra, Ghana, Frick-
Trzebitzky (2017) argues that a critical institutional/institutional
bricolage lens can enrich adaptive capacity research and help to
identify the possibilities for transformative change. For Frick-
Trzebitsky, who understands adaptive capacity as embedded in
institutional and social contexts, a bricolage lens helps to identify
who is most/least likely to be able to adapt, how culture is deployed
as an authoritative resource in adapted arrangements, and how
this reinforces the power of particular actors and institutions (here
the chiefs/chieftaincy). The key elements of adaptive governance
and critical institutionalism discussed in this section are shown
in Table 1.
ILLUSTRATING CRITICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
Having profiled the development and essential characteristics of
the two schools of thought (see Fig. 1 and Table 1), let us illustrate
adaptive governance and critical institutional approaches by way
of an analysis of two scenarios. Here we show how a critical
institutional lens can add to an adaptive governance
understanding, by offering insights into process, power, and
meaning.
Illustration 1: Coastal Ring, Sweden (Source: Sandstrom 2008)
The Coastal Ring organization comprises three coastal villages
in northern Sweden, on the Gulf of Bothnia. It is part of a
comanagement arrangement that originally formed as a
partnership with the County Administrative Board (CAB). This
case is interesting because it would appear to reflect many of the
attributes that characterize adaptive governance, as outlined
below. Also of interest is the fact it is located in Sweden. To this
extent, unlike a good deal of critical institutional research, here
Ecology and Society 23(2): 49
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol23/iss2/art49/
Table 1. Key elements of adaptive governance and critical institutionalism compared.
 
Key elements Adaptive Governance
A complex adaptive systems approach wherein
multiple cross scale institutions facilitate
experimentation, learning, and change.
Critical Institutionalism
A complex embedded systems approach wherein
the scope for adaptation is shaped by societal
structures, power relations, and social norms.
Complexity and scale Social-ecological systems are inherently complex.
This complexity arises from interactions within
and across spatial and temporal scales. AG
operates best at bioregional scales where
ecosystems and institutional arrangements are
compatible.
Complexity is an inherent feature of social
systems, and of the interface of people with the
environment. It manifests in multifaceted
identities, institutional plurality, and the
intersection of local and global domains.
The unintended consequences of human actions
cause further complexity.
Resilience The capacity of a social-ecological system to
absorb natural or human shocks and to
reorganize or adapt while retaining essential
functions and characteristics. Resilience
promoted as a normatively good trait.
Resilient institutions have temporal endurance
and the capacity to adapt to changing
circumstances. Resilience not necessarily good or
bad because a resilient institution may be one that
perpetuates inequalities.
Networks Self-organizing, multilevel networks of actors
enable learning, trust, power sharing,
information transfer, and shared visions.
“Shadow” (informal) networks allow for
experimentation that may facilitate desirable
system transformation.
Dynamic webs of relationships, loyalties, and
dependencies shape people’s engagement with
governance. Formal and everyday social networks
intersect in practice. The plurality of networks
offers multiple channels for accessing resources
and for the exercise of power.
Institutions, adaptation, and social learning Institutions as a system of rules, laws, policies,
and norms that incentivize individuals to behave
in certain ways. AG requires a structure of
diverse, nested, cross-scale institutions that
facilitate experimentation, learning, and change.
Institutions can be designed for purpose.
Institutions as bundles of norms, practices, and
rules. Institutions are hybrids, blending the old
and new, formal and informal, formed through
bricolage (improvisation and adaptation) in
everyday settings. History, social structure, power
relations, meaning, and legitimacy are key to how
institutions work. Institutions partially elude
design.
Power and agency AG requires “power sharing” between actors.
Powerful actors seen as champions of
transformation, providing leadership and vision,
generating trust, managing conflicts, preparing
organizations for change, and creating learning
environments.
Implicit assumption of boundedly rational actors
strategically exercising agency.
Power is exercised visibly and invisibly in multiple
social spaces. Powerful actors are able to
command allocative and authoritative resources.
They have the capacity to establish the terms of
debate, set the agenda, and to legitimize adapted
arrangements.
Agency is conscious and nonconscious and is
enabled and constrained by available resources,
social identities, dynamic contexts, and webs of
relationships.
Outcomes Evaluated through a social-ecological resilience
lens, assumes adaptive governance will produce a
desired set of outcomes.
Evaluated through a social justice lens: what are
the implications for resource access, exercise of
voice, and livelihoods?
the context is an affluent First World country with a system of
strong formal governance. Sweden is also the location of one of
adaptive governance’s most emblematic case studies, involving
the adaptive comanagement of Kristianstads Vattenrike, a
wetland landscape in the south of the country.
An adaptive governance analysis
An adaptive governance framing would stress a number of key
features of this Coastal Ring case. To begin with, the
comanagement arrangement emerged in response to a perceived
crisis. Here it was not environmental degradation but the inclusion
of the mouth of the Kalix River in the European Commission’s
Natura 2000 Environmental Protection Network. Locals from
three villages on the river mouth, feeling a sense of state
encroachment and outsider interference, responded by forming
the Coastal Ring organization. In 2002, the organization had a
formal charter, a governing board of five to seven members, the
active participation of 20 to 25 people, and attendance at meetings
varying between 100 to 200 people. A year later, it had negotiated
an informal mandate to manage the nearby Likskärs island nature
reserve as a subcontractor to CAB. The following year a formal
management agreement was reached whereby the Coastal Ring
organization was funded by CAB to undertake day-to-day
management activities in the reserve.  
In adaptive governance parlance, the emergence of this
arrangement reflects a self-organizing process that was facilitated
by enabling legislation, including Agenda 21, which the Coastal
Ring organization drew upon to create their own local Agenda
21 plan for the three villages and a local management plan for
Likskärs island nature reserve. Over time, the Coastal Ring
organization has evolved as part of a governance arrangement
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spanning scales of organization and a diverse network of public
and third sector actors. These include the Swedish University of
Agricultural Sciences, the Kalix Agricultural College, the Swedish
Popular Movement for Rural Development, the Gaia
Foundation, the Swedish International Development Agency,
and the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization. The functions
and activities of the Coastal Ring organization have also
expanded to include creating new rules for fisheries management,
managing open-air bathing and picnic areas, constructing log
cabins, paths, wind and firewood shelters in the forest, developing
a carbon sink project, and feeding into policy decision making
processes.  
There is in place, therefore, an evolving governance arrangement
comprising a system of formal and informal institutions, cross-
scale networks, and different interest groups and types of
knowledge that have ostensibly coalesced around a particular
environmental management agenda. An adaptive governance
framing would emphasize the role of a shared vision, a window
of opportunity, trust building, power sharing, social learning,
flexible institutions, and the like.
A critical institutional analysis
By contrast, a critical institutional lens brings to the fore aspects
of the situation that are typically omitted or overlooked from
adaptive governance scholarship.[4] Here we will focus on key
features of process, power, and meaning as they relate to the nature
of institutions. In particular, we consider the relationship between
structure and agency: how dynamic and creative human agency
is enabled and constrained by social structure while at the same
time reproducing or transforming that structure, and therefore
the means for future action.  
A central feature of this case study concerns the difference (of
positions, perspectives, and interests) that characterize the
relationship between the Coastal Ring organization and
government actors. Crucially, the comanagement arrangement
that has emerged has not resulted from a smoothing over or
working out of these differences. Instead, from a critical
institutional perspective it can be understood as reflecting a
process of ongoing negotiation and contestation whereby the
various actors involved manoeuvre into positions of mutual
accommodation by drawing on available resources. These
resources include social relationships, forms of knowledge,
funding, legislation, policy, and dominant discourses sourced
from local, national, and international domains. This reveals how
power is crucially linked to the distribution of different types of
resources in society, and to the capability of the actors involved
to access and mobilize them toward particular ends. In doing so,
institutions are forged that reflect these power relations.  
For example, the Coastal Ring organization attempted to secure
its mandate to manage the Likskärs island nature reserve and the
local village commons by drawing on the resources of the state.
Here various members of the organization scrutinized Swedish
policy and legal documents to identify scope for local
environmental management activities and comanagement
initiatives. The organization also drew on international
discourses, such as the “think global act local” slogan, and policy
trends toward decentralization and collaborative environmental
management in order to confer upon it legitimacy and the
authority to act.  
As a result of these tactical developments, the government became
an outside force to resist (with respect to the Natura 2000
designation of the Kalix River mouth), a partner to work with,
and a resource to draw from. Likewise, although officials in the
CAB were concerned to limit the amount of power ceded to the
Coastal Ring organization, which they did not fully trust, the
arrangement that emerged nonetheless became a case study the
Swedish Ministry of the Environment draws upon to share with
a wider international audience. Furthermore, as a result of the
attention given to it, members of the Coastal Ring organization
were invited to meetings and workshops that fed into national
policy making processes.  
Looking at the local formation of the Coastal Ring organization
through a critical institutional lens reveals other aspects
associated with institutional bricolage. Among these is the
adaptation of past practices to new situations. This relates to the
way in which locals adopted and adapted an ancient village
institution, the byalag, in order to form the Coastal Ring
organization. Although membership of the traditional byalag 
depended on ownership of land, in the new arrangement this
requirement was broadened to include anyone living in the area
or with a local connection. Another key feature is the invention
of tradition, whereby villagers developed narratives about former
times that stress community, a shared identity, and a culture and
economy in harmony with the local environment. These narratives
tended to downplay historical differences and the fact that some
of the members of the Coastal Ring organization were relative
newcomers, lacking the historical claim to place and tradition.
The effect was the emergence of an arrangement imbued with
meanings that conferred legitimacy upon it and provided a sense
of purpose and direction for the villagers.  
From an institutional bricolage perspective, it is recognized that
the process of forming the Coastal Ring organization, although
often highly innovative, occurred as a result of both conscious
and nonconscious agency as those involved pieced together the
arrangement from the old and new, traditional and modern,
formal and informal, in accordance with the resources at hand.
To explore some of these issues further, let us consider the case
of a project that was established broadly according to the
principles of adaptive governance (as identified by Nunan 2016).
Illustration 2: The SWAUM Project, Tanzania (Source: J. Colvin
and F. Maganga 2016, unpublished manuscript[5]; SWAUM
database)[6]
The Sustainable Water Access, Use, and Management (SWAUM)
Project was established by the NGO WWF with funding from the
UK Department for International Development (DFID). It was
conceived of as a social learning intervention with the aim of
addressing the shortfalls in water governance arrangements in the
Great Ruaha River Catchment in Tanzania. Concerns about the
catchment first arose in the 1990s, resulting from the periodic
drying up of the Great Ruaha River. The problems of water
governance in the area were understood as complex or “wicked,”
involving a variety of stakeholders, uses, and values;
disagreements about the nature of the problem; knowledge gaps;
uncertainties; and capacity constraints. From the later 1990s
onward, a number of donor-funded initiatives were implemented,
aimed at improving the natural resource management in the
catchment. The case considered here built on these but aimed at
a different approach to furthering adaptation in practice.
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An adaptive governance analysis
The SWAUM pilot project (2011–2016) aimed to use social
learning approaches to bring stakeholders into dialogue and
enable them to address the constraints on implementing water
governance. The long-term goal was to restore perennial flows in
the Great Ruaha River and, through flexible and adaptive
approaches, generate improvements to livelihoods, wildlife,
tourism, and hydropower. The initiative would also facilitate
behavior change by promoting better land and water management
practices, increased commitment to collaborate from
stakeholders, and improved institutional capacity at various
levels. In line with adaptive governance principles, broad
stakeholder participation was promoted through workshops.
These facilitated multistakeholder platforms (MSPs) were
designed to open spaces up for reflective dialogue, raise awareness,
seek agreement on joint action, and consolidate learning.  
The project set out to promote horizontal integration of
representatives from different ministries (water, agriculture,
energy, local government), the NGO and universities, smallholder
and commercial farmers, representatives of the national park, and
wildlife conservation interests. Shared knowledge and iterative
decision making was promoted in “learning through action”
collaborative initiatives. These included conservation agriculture
with trees; land use planning; delivery of livestock troughs and
dams; and technical training on agricultural intensification and
water monitoring and water quality sampling. Training was
provided for officials in the design and facilitation of MSPs, and
policy advocacy activities formed part of the project with
monitoring and review built in throughout.  
An evaluation in 2016 found that SWAUM had strengthened
adaptive water governance in a number of ways. Improvements
were identified in vertical (multilevel), horizontal (between
sectors), and upstream-downstream aspects of coordination
between stakeholders. Involvement of some marginalized groups
in catchment management was increased and their voices
amplified in debate. Private sector actors had been brought into
discussions about water governance and a degree of political
engagement at district, regional, and national levels was secured
for collaborative approaches. Some limited improvement in land
and management practices in subcatchment areas was identified.
The evaluation concluded that the project had laid the basic
building blocks for collaborative and adaptive water governance
but that the process of achieving this was ongoing.  
Some constraints on effectiveness were also identified in the
evaluation report, many of which the project had tried to address.
The SWAUM approach adopted inevitably tested existing power
structures and there were tensions and variable levels of
commitment between key actors (WWF Tanzania, WWF UK,
Rufiji Basin Office) some of whom saw the collaborative initiatives
as challenging the status quo. Lack of capacity in government
offices affected sustainability and the motivation of staff  to be
involved in complex processes, and there was an absence of
mechanisms to integrate between sector hierarchies. Adaptive
governance partly depended on water user associations (WUAs)
as the local level institution available through which to secure
stakeholder participation and channel initiatives. However, there
was not a full complement of WUAs and they lacked capacity,
clarity of roles and of relationship to local government. The
project had deliberately set out to include marginalized
stakeholders but did not secure significant representation of
pastoralists. Despite considerable debate and agreement to
protect water sources, local people continued to cultivate
riverbanks and riverbeds, possibly to the detriment of river flows.
A critical institutional analysis
How does a critical institutional reading provide additional
insights into the nature of processes, power, and meaning to
explain some of the difficulties of achieving adaptive governance?
If  we see the MSPs and the WUAs as designed institutional
arrangements then this raises questions as to how they gain
legitimacy and authority. From a bricolage perspective, this would
involve borrowing, invoking, or inventing traditions, symbols,
devices, analogies, and classifications that link the MSP or the
WUA to established and accepted forms of governance (and
therefore to prevailing power relations). For the MSP in
particular, the large number of different stakeholders involved
means that there is likely to be a significant plurality of repertories,
values, logics, and authorizing symbols that could potentially be
deployed. Such plurality offers both opportunity (a rich stock of
arrangements) and constraint (diverse and incompatible logics,
the domination of particular discourses) with no guarantee that
differences will be smoothed out in public debate.  
As well as understanding the conscious learning and agreements
forged in defined institutional spaces, a critical institutional
perspective would locate resource use in the processes of everyday
life, which are imbued with power relations, systems of meaning,
and right ways of doing things[7]. Take for example the practice
of streambank/bed cultivation, prohibited by law, by formal
institutional rules, and in the multistakeholder dialogue, and yet
universally practiced. There are strong discourses that can be
deployed to justify the cultivation of riverbanks, derived from
national policy (priority for food security); livelihoods (we are
poor, we must eat!); history (our fathers and forefathers did this);
and citizenship (we are the rightful owners/users of this land, it
is our right to cultivate). These may well be at odds with
conservation logics (streambank/bed cultivation causes erosion
and siltation and therefore impedes the flow of the rivers). This
is complicated by the fact that actors have multiple identities. The
Chair of the water user association or the District Conservation
Officer may well also be farmers, utilizing the fertile land of
riverbanks and beds to grow crops to support their families. There
may therefore be a significant gap between what they say in public
processes of deliberation and what they actually practice in their
everyday lives.  
Regarding power, a critical institutional approach would suggest
the need to be aware of the more structural dimensions of power
at the societal level that shape local decision-making dynamics.
Of particular relevance here is the way that some actors are able
to exercise hidden power to shape the nature of discussions, the
terms of debate, and the valuing of contributions to it. Such a
lens may help to throw light on why, despite good intentions, it
was difficult to involve pastoralists. These attempts failed to
overcome dominant societal narratives that blame pastoralists for
resource depletion. These views unintentionally leaked into
SWAUM processes, influencing thinking and behavior. The wider
discourses of society prioritize irrigated agriculture as essential
to food security and development. These discourses are matched
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by resource allocations, through large donor funded initiatives to
support famers. At the same time, there are strong policy
imperatives for conservation and a broad spectrum of vocal and
well-resourced actors arguing for this ranging from the national
parks authorities to the private safari operators. Both of these
wider societal priorities provide the legitimizing frames that
(consciously and unconsciously) work to exclude the pastoralists.
CONCLUSIONS
The accounts we have provided of adaptive governance and
critical institutionalism suggest scope for the latter to invigorate
the former in a number of ways. The preceding sections also
appear to circumscribe some of the optimism we see as inherent
in much adaptive governance literature, and which we have
attempted to demonstrate by way of the two illustrations above.
The intention has not been to produce a negative account of
adaptive governance but rather to demonstrate how critical
institutional insights are able to provide a more realistic
understanding of the potential for adaptive and equitable forms
of governance to emerge and evolve. Specifically, we argue that
critical institutionalism provides a set of theoretical insights that
usefully attend to issues of process, power, and meaning in
adaptive governance. Doing so helps to overcome the normative
trap associated with a recipe-of-ingredients approach, and
responds to calls from a wide range of authors to better address
the political, social, and cultural dimensions of adaptive
governance and of resilience thinking more generally. Here, we
revisit and integrate the core arguments raised above in order to
discuss the specific ways in which a critical institutional reading
can contribute to adaptive governance theory and practice.
Process
A critical institutional perspective can enhance analyses of
adaptive governance by explaining the processes through which
environmental governance arrangements emerge and endure.
Such explanation is furthered by deploying the concept of
institutional bricolage. Key insights of this perspective are that
governance arrangements are pieced together consciously and
nonconsciously as an adaptive response to change where
components for these arrangements may be borrowed, adapted,
and blended from a range of different sources. Significantly, such
hybrid arrangements are made to seem appropriate or natural by
drawing on accepted sources and symbols of authority and
legitimacy. The implications for adaptive governance are that
institutions designed for purpose (knowledge sharing platforms,
resource management arrangements, social learning networks)
may only work and endure when they also serve other socially
valued purposes and are embedded in accepted practices and
forms of behavior. An institutional bricolage lens therefore
provides a more nuanced and socially informed appreciation of
the ways in which people can adapt or transform social
arrangements in the face of change.
Power
A critical institutional perspective can add power sensitivity to
adaptive governance approaches. Critical institutionalists view
power relations (and the inequitable outcomes they produce) as
an inherent feature of social and political life. Although adaptive
governance places faith in powerful actors to be champions of
change, a critical institutional lens tempers this optimistic view,
seeing powerful actors as likely to be concerned with consolidating
their interests across different domains of action. Drawing on
both material and symbolic resources (including cultural and
political symbols of authority) they are better placed to ensure
that change is undertaken on terms that benefit them. However,
critical institutional researchers also expand their analysis away
from individual actors to understand how power is embedded in
wider societal relations and reproduced in everyday interactions.
This is a view of power as inherent to governance. The allocation
of resources in society, the dominance of particular narratives
about cause and effect, and about the proper order of social and
political life operate in visible, hidden, and invisible ways to
pattern the outcomes of governance processes. This critical
institutional view of power may help to shed light on why designed
interventions for adaptive governance deliver less than expected,
or result in unanticipated consequences. A critical institutional
analysis has the potential to help reveal hidden processes that may
be obstacles to progressive change.
Meaning
For critical institutionalists, it is impossible to understand
environmental arrangements without appreciating that meaning
and values adhere to them beyond their directly instrumental
function. These meanings encompass worldviews about cause and
effect in the human and natural worlds and different logics of
action (for example the comparative values attributed to collective
or individual action). Attribution of meaning is crucial for
legitimizing and sanctioning relationships by relating them to
accepted knowledge and familiar socio-political and
environmental orders. Meaning (and power) therefore helps to
ensure the acceptability and durability of institutional
arrangements. Lessons for adaptive governance include the need
to be aware that multiple processes of meaning making (beyond
those of the adaptive governance focus) will likely shape adaptive
governance arrangements in unplanned directions.  
These concluding remarks highlight that process, power, and
meaning are inextricably bound up with one another and should
not be treated in isolation. However, this does not prohibit the
use of these analytical distinctions in order to better conceive of
and critically investigate adaptive governance. In this paper, we
have argued that the theoretical insights critical institutionalism
offers proves instructive in this regard.  
__________  
[1] Nunan abstracts these principles from the literature: adaptive
governance systems and processes should, (1) be flexible and able
to respond to change, (2) generate, use, and share knowledge for
iterative decision making, (3) encourage coordination and
cooperation between sectors and actors, (4) enable broad
stakeholder participation, (5) facilitate behavior change, and (6)
emphasize processes rather than structures.
[2] We are drawing here more broadly on strands of thought aligned
to adaptive governance to greater or lesser degrees. These include
broader environmental resource governance approaches, those
concerned with SES and resilience thinking and those concerned
with specific governance instruments such as payments for
ecosystems services.
[3] See for example the series of World Development Reports from
the late 1990s into the early 2000s in which institutions are
proposed as key to ensuring the flourishing of markets,
sustainable environmental management, and good governance,
in the interests of propoor development.
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[4] It should be noted that in writing up his research on the Coastal
Ring, Sandstrom draws on both adaptive governance and critical
institutional framings.
[5] Evaluation of the Ruaha Water Programme (RWP), Phase 2
(2011–2016): Sustainable Water Access, Use and Management
(SWAUM) Part 1 – Main report. Dr John Colvin (Emerald
Network Ltd) and Dr Faustin Maganga (University of Dar es
Salaam).
[6] The authors gratefully acknowledge the insights gained from
numerous conversations with Mike Morris about this project,
although we take responsibility for the framing and
interpretation. The evaluation report used as a primary source
for this case study also refers to a wide range of process
documentation contained on the project database. The authors
drew on some of these documents to gain greater understanding
of the case, necessarily presented in outline here.
[7] Such a focus on everyday practices indeed could be said to align
with the SWAUM approach to social learning.  
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